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1. Introduction
Unlike many facets of language – phonology, syntax, semantics or even prag-
matics – linguistic politeness (LP) has attracted little attention of evolutionarily
minded researchers. We think that this lack of interest – apart from a few isolated
attempts (van Rooy, 2003; Żywiczyński, 2012; Wacewicz et al., 2015; Pleyer &
Pleyer, 2016) is not dictated by a peripheral status of LP for the description of
language, and especially for language evolution. LP is a universal characteristic
of languages (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1987) but its specific markers are subject to
considerable cultural variation, a combination of features that makes it an interest-
ing target for evolutionary modeling. Next, LP is first and foremost a set of inter-
actional strategies, and hence naturally lends itself to rendering in game-theoretic
terms (cf. Quinley, 2011). In this paper, we take a game-theoretic approach and
make a case that LP can be subsumed under a more general explanatory principle:
disalignment of interests. This is formally expressed as the Politeness Equilibrium
Principle (PEP), whereby the more disalignment there is between the interests of
Speaker and Hearer, the more LP Speaker needs to use to offset the imbalance.
Furthermore, we present a game-theoretic model to show that the use of LP pre-
dicated on the PEP forms an evolutionary stable system.
2. The Politeness Equilibrium Principle
Possibly, the main problem of rendering LP into evolutionary terms concerns its
operationalization. LP, although admittedly elusive, is in principle measurable;
e.g. it can be stated in terms of speech indirectness (Leech, 1983; Brown & Levin-
son, 1987), which in turn closely correlates with utterance length (Östman, 1989).
Furthermore, following Brown and Levinson (1987), we assume the rationality
of a competent Speaker, who is able to strategically increase and decrease the
amount of LP in her utterances. Finally, we suggest that the use of LP involves
social costs: the more LP Speaker uses, the more cost she has to pay. This point is
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in line with the conceptualization of LP as social commodity (Werkhofer, 2005),
whereby using politeness incurs Speaker’s payment in the currency of face (Brown
& Levinson, 1987) or respect (Kaplan, 1999).
In the present work, we focus on one type of speech act: request. In this re-
gard, we assume that Speaker follows the following principle:
Politeness Equilibrium Principle (PEP): The amount of linguistic politeness
Speaker uses in a request corresponds negatively to the alignment of interests1
between Speaker and Hearer: the less aligned the interests are in favor of Speaker,
the more linguistic politeness she uses.
3. The PPL model
Based on a principle in animal communication2 (Johnstone, 1997; Zahavi & Za-
havi, 1997; Searcy & Nowicki, 2005), we developed a game-theoretic model (PEP
model) that shows that the strategic use of LP according to the PEP forms an evo-
lutionarily stable system (Maynard Smith, 1982), but only under the following
conditions: i) the usage of LP involves substantial costs (of social nature), ii)
Speaker is rational in that she wants to maximize her payoff, defined as the dif-
ference between her expected utility of getting the request granted by Hearer and
the costs involved, and iii) the disalignment of interests (reflecting how big a fa-
vor is being requested) does not exceed a particular degree: there are requests that
Hearer will never grant, no matter how much LP Speaker uses. This last point is in
line with more general theoretical work on game-theoretic signaling models that
shows that signaling systems are not evolutionary stable when the magnitude of
disaligment between Speaker and Hearer is too large (Crawford & Sobel, 1982).
4. Outlook
The PEP model is only a first step towards understanding the evolutionary stability
of LP, and further work is necessary to make the model more complete. Most
importantly, this includes taking into account other key variables that determine
the amount of LP used in a request, such as social distance, power, or cultural
competence. Furthermore, while the current version of the PEP model focuses on
strategic behavior of Speaker, a more complete model will also take the strategic
behavior of Hearer into consideration.
1Note: In Politeness theory the role of alignment of interests was already discussed as a factor for
the choice of LP in requests, termed by Brown and Levinson (1987) as Rate of Imposition.
2This principle follows the pattern: ‘the more an individual needs, the more intensive is its signal’
and can e.g. be found in food begging of offspring of birds (cf. Searcy & Nowicki, 2005, Fig. 1.2).
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